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TERRY V. OHIO, THE WARREN COURT, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A LAW
CLERK'S PERSPECTIVE
EARL C. DUDLEY, JR.*

I feel very much like one who, to use a current term, has
been "outed" from a closet in which I have resided for thirty
years. When John Barrett first invited me last fall to participate
in this conference, he told me that he had learned from my coclerk Ty Brown that I was the law clerk who worked for Chief
Justice Warren on Terry v. Ohio' and its companion cases.2 I responded that I had no difficulty acknowledging in a private conversation with a fellow academic that I had been the Chiefs law
clerk on Terry, but that I had never spoken in public-or even in
any detail in private-about my work for the Chief Justice on
any case. This was because of the stress he placed on confidentiality. I still recall vividly our first meeting with Chief Justice
Warren in the fall of 1967. He told us that he considered us his
lawyers and that our work for him was covered by the attorneyclient privilege. He acknowledged that we would discuss the
work of the Court with clerks from other chambers, but said that
he expected what was said and done in his chambers to remain
there.
John said that he would honor my views but that he hoped I
would in any event attend the conference. We did not speak
again until February, and this time John said there was something I should know. He had recently been doing research at the
Library of Congress and had been given access to the Warren
papers. He had read-and indeed made copies of-many of the
preliminary drafts and memoranda I had prepared for the Chief
in Terry, Sibron, and Peters. So much for the attorney-client
privilege!
Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1
2

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (deciding Sibron v. New York and

Peters v. New York).
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John was kind enough to send me copies of the memos that
he had copied from the Terry file, and so I had the eerie experience of rereading words I had written thirty years ago on a topic
that has continued to interest me, one which in recent years I
have come to teach in law school regularly.
Despite my trip down memory lane, what I want to say
about Terry, its companions and its progeny derives, not so much
from those once-confidential drafts and memos, but largely from
the opinions as published and the historical setting in which the
Court first ventured into the world of "stop and frisk."
First the historical setting. Two powerful political and legal
vectors intersected in the Terry cases in 1968.
In 1960, the Civil Rights movement, which had largely received support and encouragement from the Supreme Court, but
had relatively little to show for it, took its case from the courthouses to the streets. While bus boycotts, and rallies and demonstrations in support of lunch-counter sit-ins and of voting
rights for black citizens effectively dramatized the continuing
scourge of racism, they also created a backlash even among those
sympathetic to the underlying cause. At the same time, despite
legislative victories such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, frustration at the slow rate of progress boiled over into riots in urban ghettoes from Newark to Detroit to Los Angeles. It was the decade of the long, hot summers.
When opponents of the Vietnam War also to took to the streets
beginning in about 1967, political tension and violence escalated
even further. Only two months before Terry was handed down,
there was a major outbreak of rioting in many cities, including
Washington, D.C., in the wake of the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.
At the same time, the Supreme Court had come under heavy
fire for its decisions enforcing the constitutional claims of those
accused of crimes. In 1964 the Court's criminal procedure decisions were for the first time a major target of the Republican
presidential campaign, and similar attacks were to be expected
in the upcoming 1968 election.
In this context the police made a politically powerful, and
common-sensical argument that they needed greater authority to
deal with street encounters that always had the potential to escalate into violence. Several states passed statutes authorizing
"stop and frisk" tactics, and the courts of other states recognized
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such authority under common law and state constitutional rubrics.
Individually, the Justices of the Supreme Court may have
felt differing degrees of sympathy with the arguments of the police, but collectively they were unwilling to be-or to be perceived
as-the agents who tied the hands of the police in dealing with
intensely dangerous and recurring situations on city streets.
On the other hand, many of the Justices were skeptical
about the scope of the authority claimed by the police. The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, chaired by Attorney General Katzenbach, had
just issued its massive report, which was critical of many police
practices, including some aspects of so-called "aggressive patrol"
tactics in urban ghettoes.3
Moreover, there was some reluctance to recognize authority
on the part of the police to detain a person for investigative purposes on less than the traditional standard of probable cause.
Such detention could quickly expand for all purposes into an arrest. Nor was there universal trust in the neutrality of the
authorities. While the red-baiting fever of the 1950s had eased
somewhat, J. Edgar Hoover was still the Director of the FBI, the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and its counterpart, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
were still very powerful, global communism was still seen as the
major threat to democratic institutions, and political tensions
ran high on a number of fronts, but especially over the war in
Vietnam. Nor had First Amendment doctrine yet attained its
current robust state. In this context, the power to "detain" for
"investigation" on mere "suspicion" seemed, at least, susceptible
of major abuse.
I recall not being surprised by the vote to affirm in Terry,
though I was taken a bit aback by its initial unanimity. (Justice
Douglas voted at first with the majority but later changed his
vote.) This unanimity, I soon learned, masked an almost complete lack of consensus about just how simultaneously to recognize and to cabin this new police authority. The Court's fum3 See PRESIDENT'S CoMmIN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-84 (1967). These tactics, the Commission found, were
directed all too often at minority groups, and if employed without considerable restraint, inevitably gave rise to resentments that further fanned the flames of violence
and political unrest. Id
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bling effort to find a satisfactory solution to this problem, and
the evident difficulty of that effort, are for the most part plain on
the face of the published opinions.
One thing, I suppose, that is not apparent from the published opinions is the evolution of Terry's solution to the doctrinal conundrum that confronted the Court.
Without ever facing an explicit challenge on the point, the
Court had historically read the Fourth Amendment's two clauses
in pari materia. The Warrant Clause's standard of "probable
cause" had been taken to define the "reasonableness" of a search
and seizure, even where obtaining a warrant was excused as impracticable.4 This made a good deal of sense, for while the Court
had occasionally wavered, it had generally encouraged law enforcement officers to go before a magistrate whenever possible
before conducting a search,5 and it seemed anomalous to recognize a broader authority in the police acting alone than that
which a magistrate could grant them under the Warrant Clause.6
This conundrum led to early efforts to articulate the Terry
standard in terms of "probable cause," but "probable cause" to do
less intrusive things than full-body searches and formal arrests.
These efforts foundered on the rather obvious fact that no one
really suggested that Officer McFadden in Terry had "probable
cause" to believe much of anything.
It was Justice Brennan who suggested, after the initial Warren draft had sat for several weeks without collecting any votes,
what emerged eventually as the doctrinal solution-the analytical separation of the amendment's two clauses. In a context-swiftly developing street encounters-where obtaining a warrant
was inherently impracticable, Justice Brennan argued, the strictures of the Warrant Clause were simply inapplicable, and the
definition of a "reasonable" search could and should be cut free
from the standard of "probable cause." Convinced that this offered a more sensible way to analyze the new authority that the
' See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959) (stating that felony
arrests without warrants require probable cause).
' See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (explaining that an
impartial judicial officer, not a police officer or government enforcement agent, must
decide, whenever practicable, when the right of privacy reasonably yields to the power
to search).
6 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (objecting to allowing an
officer to act without "probable cause" in a situation wherein a magistrate would have
lacked authority to issue a warrant).
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Court was prepared to recognize, the Chief Justice incorporated
this approach into a new draft. This doctrinal move led to the
defection of Justice Douglas.
There remained, however, a major fault line that is quite
apparent on the face of the opinions. This division involved
whether, and to what extent, to recognize a power of investigative detention on less than probable cause.
From the outset, it was Chief Justice Warren's instinct to
uncouple the "frisk" from the "stop" and to give the Court's explicit blessing only to the former. The Court's unanimous vote,
after all, was almost certainly prompted by the Justices' collective recognition of the need of police officers to protect themselves and bystanders from armed men whose encounters with
authority could-and often did-escalate quickly into violence. A
determination that it was "reasonable" for policemen confronted
with actors they reasonably suspected of criminal activity to
"seize" them and conduct a limited "search" for dangerous weapons did not necessarily involve approval of the much more amorphous and troublesome power to "detain" a person for purposes
of investigation on less than probable cause to arrest. Such a
power was not merely susceptible of significant abuse, it was
very difficult either to define or to confine. As the Court's subsequent efforts-Mendenhall,7 Chesternut,8 and Hodari D.,9 to
mention but three-have shown, it is often nearly impossible to
locate the moment at which an initially consensual encounter
has produced a "seizure" for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis. And there was concern that, because the threshold of
the power to "frisk" for safety reasons would necessarily be quite
low, the power to "stop" or detain, if linked to the power to
"frisk," would be exercised on very little suspicion indeed.
For others, principally Justices Harlan and White, the power
to "frisk" for weapons flowed as a matter of logic from, and hence
was doctrinally dependent upon, an antecedent power to "stop,"
or as Justice Harlan put it, to conduct a "forcible stop." Only if
the officer was justified in forcibly inserting himself into a developing situation and controlling the actions of the individuals involved would the need arise to pat the latter down to determine
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
8

Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).

9 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
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whether they were armed.°
Rightly or wrongly-and I should confess that my memos reveal that I strongly advocated this position-Chief Justice Warren held the line and declined to reach the issue of the power to
"cstop" (or at least to detain for investigative purposes on less
than probable cause). Thus the debate that occupied considerable time and effort within the Court played itself out in footnote
16 and its accompanying text in Chief Justice Warren's Terry
opinion1 1 and the concurring opinions of Justices Harlan and
White. The investigative "stop" was left for another day.
Thus the standard description of Terry is ironically deficient
in two respects. The majority opinions in Terry, Sibron, and Peters carefully refrained from approving-indeed, they circumambulated Robin Hood's barn to avoid approving-what have become known universally as "Terry stops." And nowhere in Chief
Justice Warren's opinion will you find the words "reasonable
suspicion" that have come to exemplify the Terry standard. Instead, the opinion carefully employs and adapts the language of
Brinegar v. United States,12 the classical statement of the probable cause standard, while recognizing that officers may conduct
protective searches when possessed of a lesser quantum of information. 3
The facts in Terry and Sibron helpfully allowed the Court to
avoid deciding the issue of investigative detention. Neither Officer McFadden in Terry nor Patrolman Martin in Sibron had done
anything prior to their physical searches that seemed to resemble a "forcible stop." Thus the Court could easily focus on the
physical intrusions alone in those cases, approving Officer
McFadden's protective patdown for weapons and disapproving
Patrolman Martin's grab for glassine envelopes of heroin. The
facts in Peters, the third case before the Court, were another
matter, however. There off-duty Officer Lasky, after observing
what he thought was an attempted burglary in the hallway of his
apartment building, chased Peters down two flights of stairs and
collared him in the stairwell. Only after engaging in a fairly obvious "forcible stop" did Officer Lasky pat Peters down for weap10

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34-35 (White, J., con-

curring).
11 See icL at 19-20 & n.16.
12 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
3 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27.
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ons, finding and removing from his pocket hard objects that
could have been knives but turned out to be burglar's tools. The
majority held that Officer Lasky was possessed of probable cause
for an arrest and thus that the search was properly incident to
that arrest.14 Justice Harlan argued, rather powerfully I have
always thought, that this decision lowered the standard of probable cause dramatically in an effort to avoid applying the Terry
analysis to an obvious "stop" case."
Despite what I thought then, it seems to me now that a powerful argument can be made that the line the Chief Justice-and
the majority-drew in the Terry trilogy was at least an unrealistic one. Justice Harlan may have had it backwards. That is, the
power to "frisk" inevitably drew with it the power to "stop" for
investigation, not the other way around. But he was correct that
the two do seem inevitably linked with one another. It was thus
perhaps inevitable that the line was breached, and the Court
recognized a power to restrain the liberty of citizens on less than
probable cause where at least before the officer acted there was
no reasonable apprehension of danger.16
On the other hand, it is just possible that the Terry opinion's
careful avoidance of the issue of investigative detention on less
than probable cause may have elevated for the Court the serious
difficulty of that issue and helped to sensitize it to the need for
careful restraint in this area. It is perhaps difficult to say
whether the Court would have been as careful to emphasize the
limits of the power to detain in cases such as Hayes 7 and
5 had the police's claim to this authority received a
Dunaway,"
more enthusiastic reception in Terry. 9 It does seem highly
likely, however, that Terry's exclusive focus on the self-protective
justification for the "frisk" power contributed to the Court's subsequent restraint respecting investigative intrusions on personal
4

See Sibron,392 U.S. at 66-67.

15 See

id. at 74-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).

16Interestingly, though the Court assumed early that Terry authorized investigative stops on less than probable cause in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), it did
not actually hold this outside the distinct border seizure context until 1985 in United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
17 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811
(1985).
18 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
19 Cf Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983) (declining to decide
"whether the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his identity when he
is detained lawfully under Terry").
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security. The Court did recognize a "plain feel" doctrine in Minnesota v. Dickerson,20 but applied it with great care to the facts of
that case, so as to limit as far as possible the officer's authority
on less than probable cause to explore the contours of a person's
body in search of evidence.
Terry was, in short, a first, cautious step along an uncharted
path, and I think it fair to say that the opinion's restraint set an
important example for the Supreme Court and lower courts in
later cases in their approach to the myriad issues that grow out
of what Chief Justice
Warren called "the protean variety of the
21
encounter."
street
I cannot resist imposing on this now-captive audience one
last point about Terry, the Warren Court and the Fourth
Amendment. The knee-jerk liberal, pro-defendant, anti-police
image that the Court in general, and Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan in particular, have been saddled with over the
years is quite plainly undeserved, at least as far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned. The Supreme Court in the Warren
years made four major forays into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Two of them were obviously pro-police, and a third has at
a minimum turned out that way. Indeed, it is fair to say that the
Warren Court completely restructured Fourth Amendment
analysis in a way clearly-and properly-favorable to law enforcement. Moreover, the two most important pro-police opinions in this restructuring project were written by Brennan and
Warren themselves.
Mapp v. Ohio' was the lone significant Warren Court
Fourth Amendment decision that was clearly pro-defendant, and
I submit that Mapp is less properly viewed as a Fourth Amendment case than as the opening move in the incorporation project.
Appalled by the barbarous systems of criminal justice that persisted in a few states into the 1960s, Chief Justice Warren
helped lead the campaign to force these states to provide sounder
and more humane procedures through the expedient of applying
most of the strictures of the Bill of Rights to the states. Mapp
applied the exclusionary rule, and hence the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment itself, to the states, but it was hardly innovative as far as Fourth Amendment doctrine is concerned. The
20

508 U.S. 366 (1993).

21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
22

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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search in Mapp was egregious, and the officers' high-handed
treatment of a woman living alone doubtless contributed to the
Court's evident loss of patience with the regime of Wolf v. Colorado.'
The Warren Court's first really significant contribution to
Fourth Amendment doctrine as such came in 1966 in Schmerber
24 written by Justice Brennan. The Court had long
v. California,
labored under the constraints of the intellectual structure laid
down in Boyd v. United States.' That case essentially "married"
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in a matrix forged by property law, to produce a "substantive" analytical structure for the
Fourth Amendment. Boyd held that a person's papers were the
equivalent of testimony for Fifth Amendment purposes, and that
any effort to circumvent the protections of the Self-Incrimination
Clause by a search for such items was inherently "unreasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment. The government could search for
and seize only those items-stolen property, contraband, etc.-to
which it had a possessory interest superior to that of the subject
of the search and seizure. Boyd and its later corollary, Gouled v.
United States," meant that the government's law enforcement
interest in the evidentiary use of personal property was insufficient to permit a search for and the seizure of such property, regardless of how much probable cause existed to believe that the
property was evidence of criminal activity.
To be sure, the Court from the beginning struggled against
the constraints of the Boyd analytical framework, concluding, for
example, that "instrumentalities" of crime were subject to seizure, perhaps-though it did not quite say so-on a "deodand"
forfeiture analogy and then giving very broad content to this
category of seizable items. 7 But in 1966 the Boyd structure with
its "marriage" of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and Gouled's
"mere evidence" rule remained intact. Indeed, it was expressly
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
exclusion in state court of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure).
24 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upholding, against Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
23

challenges the introduction in evidence of expert testimony concerning a blood sample
taken forcibly from a person arrested for driving while intoxicated).
25 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Note, The Life and Times of
Boyd v. United States
(1886-1976), 76 MICH.L. REV. 184 (1977) (tracing the doctrinal development of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment law in the wake of Boyd).
26 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
27 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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on the basis of Boyd that Justice Black had concurred in the result in Mapp.28
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Schmerber in one
stroke toppled the structure built on Boyd, "divorced" Fourth
Amendment analysis from Fifth Amendment analysis and replaced the old structure with a "procedural" view of Fourth
Amendment constraints that is more faithful to the constitutional language. The Fifth Amendment, Brennan said, was concerned exclusively with "testimony," and however much information might be derived from a person's blood, it could not
reasonably be termed testimonial. The propriety under the
Fourth Amendment of the forcible seizure of the defendant's
blood from his veins for evidentiary purposes turned exclusively
on a series of procedural considerations. The police had probable
cause to believe that Schmerber had been driving drunk, but the
evanescent nature of the alcohol content of his blood made obtaining a warrant impracticable. The seizure of the blood was
"reasonable" under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment because the blood test was a very good way to determine whether
Schmerber was drunk when he was seen driving erratically and
because the procedure was performed "reasonably" by medical
personnel in a hospital setting.2 9
Only one year later, with Justice Brennan again at the controls, the Court drove home its rejection of the Boyd-Gouled
structure in Warden v. Hayden,3 ° where it expressly abandoned
the so-called "mere evidence" rule limiting the categories of
items that police could seize.
A mere two years after Schmerber uncoupled the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, Terry did the same for the two clauses of the
Fourth Amendment in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren to
which Justice Brennan made the major doctrinal contribution.
The Court thus created a new category of police conduct completely outside the strictures of the Warrant Clause and the
"probable cause" requirement, subject only to a "sliding scale"
analysis of reasonableness that takes into account both the justification for the initial intrusion on protected values and the
scope of that intrusion in light of the prior justification.
The Warren Court's other major treatment of Fourth
28See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
29

30

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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Amendment doctrine, Katz v. United States,"' was handed down
earlier in the same term as Terry. Katz was not thought of at
the time as a pro-police decision. The early roots of Fourth
Amendment analysis in property law had created problems for
the application of the amendment to electronic surveillance.
Decisions following Olmstead v. United States,3'2 had turned upon
an almost comic search for some "trespass" that would allow the
Court to say that Fourth Amendment protected values had been
infringed by electronic surveillance.33 Katz involved a wiretap of
a public phone booth. Katz had no property interest in the
booth, and there was in any event no physical penetration of the
space of the booth by the tap. In an opinion by Justice Stewart,
joined by the Chief and Justice Brennan, a majority of the Court
continued its rewriting of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Building
upon Justice Brennan's work in Schmerber, the Court in Katz
jettisoned the property-law moorings of the Fourth Amendment
in favor of an analysis focused upon whether an individual enjoys a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 4 The presence or absence of such an expectation swiftly became the litmus test for
the application of the Fourth Amendment.
To be sure, Katz initially expanded the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment to include electronic surveillance, but its
new analytical framework has subsequently been used by the
Court to exclude from any scrutiny whatever under the amendment broad categories of police investigative conduct. Thus the
Court has held that, whether or not police conduct trenches upon
property rights, it does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if it
invades no "reasonable expectation of privacy" held by the person
against whom the resulting evidence is sought to be introduced.35
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
"' 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)
and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (affirming constitutionality of police recording of conversation between defendant and undercover
agent); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961) (holding eavesdropping by attaching microphone to heating duct in defendant's home to be physical intrusion violative of Fourth Amendment).
3' The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" was actually not mentioned in
the majority opinion, but was used by Justice Harlan in his concurrence. See Katz,
389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"6E.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (finding no reasonable expectation
that police will not hang a helicopter 400 feet above greenhouse and peer through hole
in roof); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (finding no reasonable expectation
31
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When Earl Warren and William Brennan joined the Supreme Court in the mid-1950s, law enforcement agents--or at
least government lawyers trying to defend the actions of such
agents-had to contend with the intellectual regime of Boyd and
the "mere evidence" rule, and there was no rubric of police conduct that could be justified upon less than probable cause. When
Earl Warren left in 1969, Boyd was all but dead, the reach of the
Fourth Amendment had been confined to procedural constraints,
policemen on the streets had new powers to be exercised in the
absence of either a warrant or probable cause, and a door had
been opened that would drastically narrow the compass of the
amendment in years to come. Even more, the destruction of the
Boyd framework paved the way for the decisions of the 1970s
excluding papers from the sweep of the Self-Incrimination
Clause." Not bad for a couple of woolly-headed liberals!
In bringing this to a close, I suppose I need to acknowledge
and comment on the fact that Chief Justice Warren dissented in
Schmerber37 and joined Justice Fortas's odd little concurrence in
Hayden.38 It was not then the fashion, as it is today, for a Justice
to note that he or she joins parts I-A, II-B, and III-C of the
Court's opinion, but dissents from part IV-D, etc. Had it been,
we might know with greater assurance whether the Chief Justice agreed with Justice Brennan's vast rearrangement of the
analytical landscape in Schmerber. So far as one can tell from
the Chiefs dissent itself, however, it appears likely that he had
no quarrel with the new approach as such. The dissent is brief,
consisting of little more than a citation to Warren's earlier dissent in Breithaupt v. Abram,39 where he disapproved of the
forcible removal of blood from an unconscious man, relying on
the due process test of Rochin v. California." Thus he did not
of privacy in open fields posted with "no trespassing" signs); cf Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) (holding passenger in automobile has no reasonable expectation of privacy in interior of car).
"See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (deciding summons directing attorney to produce documents delivered to him by client was not constitutionally
immune under attorney-client privilege).
37 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
"8See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310-12 (1967) (Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., concurring).
"' 352 U.S. 432, 440 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
40 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding denial of due process in introduction of testimony
about contents of defendant's stomach, which had been forcibly pumped without his
consent after his arrest).
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mention or controvert the analytical portion of the majority
opinion but went straight to what has always seemed to me its
Achilles' heel-its failure to take account, in its reasonableness
analysis, of the sanctity of the human body. It is one thing to
say, as the Court quite properly did in Schmerber, that the constraints of the Fourth Amendment are essentially procedural in
nature. It is another altogether to say that the standard of
"reasonableness" poses no greater barrier to unconsented surgical invasions of the body's interior than to an examination of the
contents of a person's coat pocket.
Some doubt as to the extent of the Chief Justice's agreement
with the Schmerber framework is raised, however, by his joining
of Justice Fortas's opinion concurring in the result in Hayden but
lamenting the overthrow of the "mere evidence" rule. That
opinion is strange and, to me at least, not very coherent, and I
am not at all sure that it is fairly read to reject the restructuring
of Fourth Amendment analysis accomplished in Schmerber.
I have taken this little detour from Terry itself because my
experience with Chief Justice Warren convinced me that he was,
above all, an enormously practical man, well-schooled in the
craft of government, and best schooled in the practice of law enforcement, which was his field for the majority of his career. The
Court's treatment of Fourth Amendment issues under his leadership displayed a practical understanding of the needs of law
enforcement and an analytical freshness that is at odds with
prevailing scholarly and judicial caricatures.
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